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ABSTRACT
THE SUPPLEMENTAL NUTRITION ASSISTANCE
PROGRAM AND CHILDCARE
KYLE KOPPLIN
2016
This paper attempts to analyze the effects of subsidized food dollars on the
amount of daily childcare in households. More specifically, households in the low income
category are of interest because they are the most likely to receive food subsidies. There
has been a political debate recently in the United States which argues over the appropriate
level of subsidies, if any. More importantly, food insecurity is an issue in the world;
many do not know where will the next meal come from. This paper provides statistical
evidence that food subsidies in the form of the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance
Program (SNAP) have a positive effect on the amount of childcare in which enrolled
households engage. Childcare is measured in minutes per day, and SNAP assistance is
measured in dollar assistance. These effects are analyzed both before and after the
increases to SNAP benefits provided by the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of
2009 (ARRA). Through the review of related literature, this paper will show that authors
in the discipline that have done studies related to food economics and childcare argue that
children who receive more childcare are better off later in their lives. Also, other authors
show that SNAP enrollment can decrease food insecurity.
Statistical analysis in this paper is done using combined datasets from the Current
Population Survey and the American Time Use Survey and the STATA© statistical
package. Regression analysis and statistical hypothesis tests are the main tools for
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determining statistical significance. Models reported are an ordinary least square model
and a two-stage least square model. Both are included in this paper because the statistical
tests for endogeneity of the of the main explanatory variable do not provide evidence to
support which model is more appropriate for the approximation of the partial effect of
SNAP on childcare.
The main conclusion found from these statistical tests is that childcare is
positively affected at the household level by subsidized food dollars from SNAP. An
implication is that increasing the magnitude of food subsidies in other forms may also
have a positive impact on childcare at the household level. Future studies ought to
examine the effects of other food subsidies in order to determine their viability in aiding
with time households can spend in childcare.

1
INTRODUCTION
A current worldwide economic issue is food insecurity where households wonder
where their next meal will come from. In order to counteract food insecurity, the United
States government has enacted several food subsidy programs. The question for
economists is whether those food subsidies actually combat food insecurity and the
residual effects that occur inside a household. One of the negative externalities of food
insecurity is a decrease in the quantity of daily childcare that households can engage in.
This phenomenon occurs for several reasons as household adults make economic
decisions to reduce food insecurity that may crowd out time spent in daily childcare.
Food subsidies aim to reduce food insecurity, and one of the outcomes to households
could be an increased magnitude of average daily childcare by household adults. This
paper examines the specific economic question whether food subsidies increase the time
that households engage in daily childcare.
Through the course of the literature review, this paper will provide evidence that
there are many positive aspects from children receiving more childcare in the household.
However, most of these aspects are intangible and difficult to measure. It should not be
trivialized that time spent in childcare provides intangible benefits. The results of this
paper may provide evidence that food subsidies could be further pursued by policy
makers to allow more households to experience the positive externalities.
The new knowledge derived from this study could be used to further examine the
effects of food subsidies in the short run and restructure government budgets for a greater
number of households to be better off in the long run. The contribution to the economic
knowledge stock can also be applied to other types of subsidies. Government agencies
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engage in subsidies beyond food, and this paper may provide a starting point for which to
examine how subsidies can have positive effects outside their intended goals.

3
BACKGROUND
Households are restricted several ways when it comes to eligibility including their
resources, income, allowable deductions, and employment. SNAP defines a household as
everyone who lives together and purchases and prepares meals together. These rules are
either adjusted or ignored when the application includes a household member that is
elderly or disabled. As far as SNAP is concerned, an elderly person is any person 60
years of age or older. A disability is more difficult to determine so there is a set of
considerations by SNAP to decide if a person is disabled. A person is considered disabled
if they:


Receive federal disability or blindness payments under the Social Security
Act



Receive state disability or blindness payments



Receives a disability retirement benefit from a governmental agency
because of a permanent disability under the Social Security Act



Receives an annuity under the Railroad Retirement Act and is eligible for
Medicare



Are a veteran who is totally disabled, permanently housebound, or in need
of regular aid



Are a surviving spouse or child of a veteran who is receiving VA benefits
and is considered to be permanently disabled

There are upper limits on the amount of a household’s resources. There are some
exceptions and exclusions to resources. The more exclusions, the more likely a household
qualifies for SNAP. A household may have up to $2,250 in deposits or cash, called
countable resources. This is increased to $3,250 if the household has at least one person
older than 60 years old or disabled. Certain resources are not counted, such as the value
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of the house or a lot. Also, resources of people who receive Temporary Assistance for
Needy Families and pension plans are non-countable. Assets such as vehicles in
possession are handled on a state-by-state basis. In some states, the value of the
household’s primary vehicle is excluded from assets. In other states, the market value of
all household vehicles are considered as non-excludable. A third way states handle
vehicles is the total exclusion of their value from household resources. The remaining
states exempt household vehicles with higher values than the SNAP standard of $4,650
from the fair market value to determine the countable resource value of the vehicle.
Perhaps the most important stipulation in determining eligibility for SNAP
benefits in this paper is household income. Table 1 lists the allowable household income
based on the number of people living in the household at the time of SNAP registration.
Table 1. SNAP Income Qualifications.
Household
Size

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
Each
additional
member

Gross
monthly
income
(130
percent of
poverty)
$1,276
$1,726
$2,177
$2,628
$3,078
$3,529
$3,980
$4,430

Net
monthly
income
(100
percent of
poverty)
$981
$1,328
$1,675
$2,021
$2,368
$2,715
$3,061
$3,408

$451

$347
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In order to receive SNAP benefits, a household’s income must not exceed the values in
Table 1. These income requirements are from October of 2015 and are valid through
September of 2016. Households must meet these requirements unless all members in the
household are receiving Temporary Assistance for Needy Families, Supplemental
Security Income, or any general subsidized assistance in some states.
Gross income is a household’s total income and non-excluded income before any
allowable deductions. Net income in the gross income less the allowable deductions. A
special note, the net income limits are higher in Alaska and Hawaii, but the Continental
United States, the District of Columbia, and all territories follow the above guidelines for
income. Most households need to meet both the net and gross income requirements to
qualify, but households with at least one elderly person or at least one person who is
receiving some types of disability payments needs only to meet the net income
requirements. There are several deductions to income that are allowed by SNAP:


A 20% deduction from earned income



A standard deduction of $155 for households with three or less people



A standard deduction of $168 for households with four or more people



A dependent care deduction when needed for work, training, or education



Medical expenses for elderly or disabled household members that are
more than $35 for the month if they are not paid by insurance or some
other benefactor



Legally owed and outstanding child support payments



Some states allow homeless households the amount of $143 for shelter
costs



Excess shelter costs that are more than half of the household’s income
after the other deductions
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o Allowable costs include the cost of fuel to heat and cook,
electricity, water, fees for basic telephone, rent/mortgage
payments, and taxed on the home
o Shelter deductions cannot exceed $504 unless one person in the
household is elderly or disabled
Once a household is determined to be SNAP eligible, there are caps to the amount
of benefits a household may receive. The benefits received by households are referred to
as allotments and apply to when the household applies for SNAP. The net monthly
income of the household is multiplied by .3 and the product is subtracted from the
maximum allotment for the household size to find the household’s allotment. The 30% is
assumed to be the amount that households will allocate toward food from their own
income. Again, the following table has values which are applicable to the contiguous
states, the District of Columbia, and territories held by the United States and are current
through September of 2016:
Table 2. SNAP Monthly Allotments.
People in
Household
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
Each
additional
person

Maximum
Monthly
Allotment
$ 194
$ 357
$ 511
$ 649
$ 771
$ 925
$ 1,022
$1,169
$

146
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Employment requirements also apply to receiving SNAP benefits. These
requirements include registering for work, not voluntarily quitting a job or asking for a
reduction of hours, not voluntarily rejecting a job when offered, and participation in
employment and training programs to be determined at the state level. Omission of any of
these requirements can result in disqualification from SNAP. Also, nondisabled adults
without dependents are required to work or be part of a work program for a minimum of
20 hours per week for more than three months in a continuous 36-month period. Table 3
contains the average enrollment, average benefit per person per day in dollars, and the
magnitude of aggregate funds dedicated to SNAP:
Table 3. SNAP Figures for Select Years.
Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program Participation and
Costs
(Data as of March 4, 2016)
Average
Benefit
All
Fiscal
Average
Per
Total
Other
Total
Year Participation Person
Benefits
Costs
Costs
Dollars
Thousands
Millions ($)
Per Day
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015

25,628
26,549
26,316
28,223
33,490
40,302
44,709
46,609
47,636
46,664
45,767

3.10
3.16
3.21
3.41
4.18
4.46
4.46
4.45
4.44
4.17
4.23

28,567.88
30,187.35
30,373.27
34,608.40
50,359.92
64,702.16
71,810.92
74,619.34
76,066.32
69,998.84
69,655.43

2,504.13
2,715.72
2,800.25
3,031.25
3,260.00
3,581.30
3,875.56
3,790.34
3,806.01
4,182.82
4,326.81

31,072.01
32,903.06
33,173.52
37,639.64
53,619.92
68,283.47
75,686.49
78,409.68
79,872.32
74,181.66
73,982.24
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The American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 contains several
governmental budget changes and resource allocations. One such change is the increase
of monthly benefit levels of SNAP by an average of 15% and easing the constraints on
SNAP eligibility for unemployed adults without children. Its intention is to decrease food
insecurity through the SNAP channel and to provide jobs to those who were searching
but still unemployed. Through these two intermediate targets, the long-run aim is to boost
purchasing power of recipients of SNAP and thus stimulate the economy with their added
capacity to engage in market transactions. Originally, SNAP was set to receive $20
billion over the five years following 2009. ARRA also allocated $300 million to states in
order to aid with the administrative costs of SNAP for the fiscal year following 2009.
There are several other provisions of ARRA:


Increasing the Thrifty Food Plan and maximum monthly allotments by an
average of 13.6%



Increase the minimum monthly benefit from $14 to $16



Eliminated the three month per three year time limit set on SNAP benefits
for adults who had no children and did not have a disability
o Still required to comply with the State Employment and Training
Programs



Increasing state administrative funding for SNAP operations by $145
million in 2009 and $150 million in 2010

The reasoning behind increasing SNAP benefits as part of ARRA is that SNAP benefits
are liquid and are therefore quickly injected back into the economy through market
transactions. These purchases would not be possible without receiving SNAP benefits
that ease the household budget constraint of SNAP recipients, meaning that these
households have more disposable income with which to engage in market activity.
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However, due to legislation since 2009, the $20 million increase in SNAP from
ARRA has been diminished. The Health, Hunger-Free Kids Act of 2010 reauthorized the
United States Department of Agriculture’s child nutrition programs and shorted the end
date for ARRA to increase SNAP benefits from 2019 back to 2013. In addition, funding
allocated for Medicaid, education, and jobs crowded out ARRA increases to SNAP
monthly benefits as of 2014. The effects of ARRA on SNAP are seen in Table 4.
Table 4. ARRA Increase to SNAP per Day.

ARRA Household Increase to SNAP
Household size
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9+

Daily Increase
$0.80
$1.47
$2.10
$2.67
$3.17
$3.80
$4.20
$4.80
$0.60/person
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LITERATURE REVIEW
Berger and Black (1992) examine the effects of childcare subsidies on the
decisions of low-income mothers and on the quality of care that children in these
situations receive. These authors use survey data from families living in Kentucky that
were enrolled in Louisville’s 4C (Community Coordinated Childcare) and Kentucky’s
Title XX Purchase of Care subsidy programs. Louisville’s 4C program includes femaleled households with income not more than 80% of the state median family income at the
time of the study. Title XX is limited to an even smaller subset of low-income female-led
households including only households with incomes not more than 60% of the state
median family income at the time of the study. The authors selected these two programs
because of the stratification in percentages of state median income to allow for analysis
across income levels even in low-income households and because of the many
similarities the two programs have in terms of qualifications and requirements. The
authors are interested in the requirement that children must be placed in licensed day care
centers, which must satisfy Kentucky standards for safety and health. The authors
obtained their data through phone interviews administered to groups of recipients, or
potential recipients on waiting lists for either subsidy program in the summer of 1989.
To analyze the impact of the subsidy on single mothers’ labor supply decisions,
the authors employ multiple regression analysis using the same right-hand-side variables
to attempt to explain hours worked and employment:
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ℎ𝑜𝑢𝑟𝑠 𝑤𝑜𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑑
= 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 𝑚𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟 𝑖𝑠 𝑏𝑙𝑎𝑐𝑘 + 𝛽2 𝑚𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟 ′ 𝑠 𝑎𝑔𝑒
+ 𝛽3 𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝑦𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑔𝑒𝑠𝑡 𝑐ℎ𝑖𝑙𝑑 + 𝛽4 𝑚𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟 ′ 𝑠𝑐ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑔
+ 𝛽5 𝑚𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟 𝑙𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑠 𝑖𝑛 𝑎𝑛 𝑢𝑟𝑏𝑎𝑛 𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑎 + 𝛽6 𝑛𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑐ℎ𝑖𝑙𝑑𝑟𝑒𝑛
+ 𝛽7 𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑎 𝑠𝑢𝑏𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑦 + 𝛽8 log(𝑤𝑎𝑔𝑒) + 𝜀
𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑢𝑠
= 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 𝑚𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟 𝑖𝑠 𝑏𝑙𝑎𝑐𝑘 + 𝛽2 𝑚𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟 ′ 𝑠𝑎𝑔𝑒
+ 𝛽3 𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝑦𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑔𝑒𝑠𝑡 𝑐ℎ𝑖𝑙𝑑 + 𝛽4 𝑚𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟 ′ 𝑠𝑐ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑔
+ 𝛽5 𝑚𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟 𝑙𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑠 𝑖𝑛 𝑎𝑛 𝑢𝑟𝑏𝑎𝑛 𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑎 + 𝛽6 𝑛𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑐ℎ𝑖𝑙𝑑𝑟𝑒𝑛
+ 𝛽7 𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑎 𝑠𝑢𝑏𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑦 + 𝛽8 log(𝑤𝑎𝑔𝑒) + 𝜀
Berger and Black (1992) conclude from surveys that those receiving either
subsidy responded with higher levels of satisfaction with their childcare arrangements, as
the effect of the subsidy on satisfaction was statistically significant. The authors also
report statistical evidence that receiving a subsidy increases employment by 11.7% for
single mothers. There is no statistical evidence to support an effect on hours worked as
the result of receiving a subsidy.
Tekin (2007) examines the effects of the price of childcare and wages on parttime and full-time employment decisions of single mothers and the choice to pay for
childcare by single mothers. The author notes that there is literature to support that an
increase in the cost of organized childcare has a negative effect on labor participation of
single mothers, but there has been no agreement in the economics discipline as to the
price elasticity of childcare on employment. The author obtains data from the 1997
National Survey of America’s Families (NSAF). Importantly, this survey contains
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information on childcare subsidies. Less vital, but still important, is the fact that these
data come after large welfare reform legislation in the early and mid-1990s. To be
eligible for federal childcare subsidies, the household income could not exceed 85% of
the state median income for families of the same size and whose parent(s) are working.
The model presented by Tekin (2007) is a single decision-maker framework where the
single mother has three choices: 1) whether to work, then to work part-time or full-time,
2) whether to pay for childcare, and 3) whether to receive a childcare subsidy if they do
decide to pay for childcare. The mother’s indirect utility function is expressed:
𝑉𝑖 = 𝑿𝛽𝑖 + 𝛼𝑃𝑖 𝑃𝑠∗ + 𝛼𝑃𝑇𝑖 𝑊𝑃𝑇 + 𝛼𝐹𝑇𝑖 𝑊𝐹𝑇 + 𝜀𝑖 ,

𝑖 = 1, … . , 𝐽

where W represents the wage rates for part-time and full-time employment, P* is the
hourly price of childcare in market s, X is the vector of preferences that do not vary
across alternatives, and β’s and α’s are the parameters to be estimated by regression
analysis. This model demonstrates how a single mother will respond to the three decision
criteria presented. From this framework, Tekin (2007) determines that a higher price of
childcare reduces utility to the mother, a higher part-time wage increases utility to the
mother if she works part-time, a higher full-time wage increases utility to the mother if
she works full-time, and a higher childcare subsidy increases utility to the mother when
she chooses to receive a subsidy. The author notes that using state dummy variables as
identifying instruments in either wages or in childcare costs would be invalid if location
affects preferences, and therefore decision-making, of single mothers. However, there are
no alternatives that are theoretically justified in order to estimate the equation parameters.
Tekin (2007) concludes that there is statistical evidence to support the claim that
increasing childcare subsidy dollars increases the employment participation of single
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mothers in both part-time and full-time categories. The author notes that these results do
not provide information about the relative cost-effectiveness of childcare subsidies and
do not answer the question of which subsidy would lead to the greatest amount of labor
force participation by single mothers. One main conclusion from this paper is that, even
though both categorical estimates are statistically significant, single mothers working
full-time are more sensitive to wage increases than part-time working single mothers.
Another conclusion is that subsidies related to childcare are likely to have a greater
impact on labor force participation by single mothers than wage subsidies for respective
subsets. The childcare price elasticity on employment found in this paper is smaller than
that of similar studies done previously, namely Blau and Hagy (1998), Michalogoulos
and Robins (2000), and Blau and Robins (1998).
Gustafsson and Stafford (1992) attempt to demonstrate the effects of specific
childcare arrangement decisions made by parents on the well-being of children. These
authors argue that this relationship cannot be properly analyzed in the United States
because the number, type, quality, and diversity of childcare arrangements makes patterns
unmeasurable because to do so would require scalar weights to deflate and decompose
the heterogeneity of different childcare options. To get around these data issues, the
authors analyze data from Sweden. Sweden has a homogeneous childcare system because
of national standards for operation. The authors argue that Sweden’s childcare market
provides better inferences about the effects of childcare options and well-being because
of the homogeneity of the arrangements. Sweden also provides a unique opportunity to
study price variation as the price for homogenous childcare differs across regions.
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The authors use data collected in a national survey for 1984 from the National
Central Bureau of Statistics combined with municipality data on childcare fees for the
same year published by Svenska Kommunfӧrbundet. There model is as follows:
𝑈 = 𝑈(𝐶ℎ𝑖𝑙𝑑 𝑤𝑒𝑙𝑙 − 𝑏𝑒𝑖𝑛𝑔, 𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑎𝑟𝑑 𝑜𝑓 𝑙𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑛𝑔)
Child well-being is specified as a function of time spent in childcare by parents
and money spent on household goods for the benefit of household children. The standard
of living is defined as a function of money spent on goods other than for the benefit of
household children. The authors note that subsidies lead to increased use of childcare
outside the home and increased market participation of parents. However, the loss of inhome child well-being need not mean the loss of child well-being altogether. That is to
say, the well-being gained from using out-of-home childcare may be greater in magnitude
than well-being lost from in-home childcare.
Gustafsson and Stafford (1992) conclude that price responsiveness to using the
childcare structure in Sweden allows for analysis to demonstrate the extent to which
subsidies in a particular municipality influences participation in these markets. They also
conclude that the net impact on the labor supply is close to zero because much of the
response to subsidies comes from the substitution effect of public for private childcare, as
subsidies in public childcare increases. The authors note that their analysis is limited due
to diversity of family situations not including wage, income, and subsidy rate for a
particular municipality. These differences lead to out-of-home childcare decisions that
are attributed to lurking variables or irrational decision-making in choosing childcare.
Hill and Stafford (1980) analyze parental time devoted to childcare during their
preschool years to discover if differentials in social class or education of parents leads to
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the transmission of income disparity intertemporally. The authors argue that
intergenerational wealth transfers through parental time spent on childcare that affects the
particular cognitive development of children during their preschool years. The Time Use
Survey is used to determine the time allocated by parents to childcare. The following is a
set of equations used to determine deviations Hit from the mean annual hours of
housework for a woman with no children:
𝐻𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + ∑𝛽𝑛 𝐶𝐻𝑛𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼𝑖𝑡
𝛼𝑖𝑡 = П1 𝑍1𝑖𝑡 + П2 𝑍2𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀1𝑖𝑡
or simplified:
𝐻𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + ∑𝛽𝑛 𝐶𝐻𝑛𝑖𝑡 + П1 𝑍1𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀2𝑖𝑡
𝜀2𝑖𝑡 = П2 𝑍2𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀1𝑖𝑡
The deviation from the mean number of hours spent on housework increases with
the number of children in the household, CHit, which is divided into age groups of the
children CHn including babies, preschoolers, grade-schoolers, and high-schoolers. Z1 is
the vector of observed variables that are known to alter the number of hours a mother
spends in childcare. Z2 is the vector of unobserved variables that alter the number of
hours a mother spends in childcare.
Hill and Stafford (1980) conclude that, because there are substantial per-child
differences in care across all levels of parental education and income, their results are
only circumstantial in determining the lifetime achievement of children based on their
care early in life. However, the authors argue that their findings suggest that moreeducated parents spend more time in childcare with their children than less-educated
parents. More-educated parents provide more market outputs to society and more time
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inputs for their children as the children develop before leaving the home. The authors
suggest, though their results are only circumstantial, that this relationship may account
for certain types of higher functioning later in life by the child in the labor market and
interpersonal relationships. Finally, the authors conclude that equal educational
opportunity could provide societal benefits in subsequent generations.
Datcher-Loury (1988) demonstrates a connection between time spent by mothers
in childcare and the corresponding children’s outcomes as adults. The author cites
Michael (1973) that the amount of time spent in childcare increases with the financial
resources available to the parents and notes that the effect of schooling in economic
literature is uniformly positive. Datcher-Loury (1988) uses data from the University of
Michigan Panel Study of Income Dynamics to analyze the effects of a mother’s time
spent in childcare on their children’s years of schooling. In this framework, the child
makes the decision to pursue schooling partly based on their care early in life and partly
based on the magnitude of financial investment made, if any, by the parent with their
perception of schooling quality. The framework assumes that the child would choose the
school where the marginal cost of the investment is equal to the marginal benefit of the
schooling. The dataset used provides information on annual hours of housework time
spent by mothers but does not directly specify the time spent in childcare. The author
uses a variant of the method used by Hill and Stafford (1980) to get at time spent in
childcare. Based on this model, the author reasons that differences in the mean value of
αit across time includes individual-specific variations in time mothers spend in childcare.
Datcher-Loury (1988) uses this metric as a proxy variable for time spent in childcare by
mothers not explicitly included in the dataset and uses the following model:
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𝛼𝑖 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 #𝐶ℎ𝑖𝑙𝑑(0 − 2) + 𝛽2 #𝐶ℎ𝑖𝑙𝑑(3 − 5) + 𝛽3 #𝐶ℎ𝑖𝑙𝑑(6 − 13)
+ 𝛽4 #𝐶ℎ𝑖𝑙𝑑(14 − 17) + 𝛽5 𝑀𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟 ′ 𝑠 𝑠𝑐ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑔
+ 𝛽6 𝐹𝑎𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟 ′ 𝑠 𝑠𝑐ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑔 + 𝛽7 𝐿𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑠 𝑖𝑛 𝑠𝑜𝑢𝑡ℎ
+ 𝛽8 𝑃𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠 𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑡 𝑐𝑜𝑙𝑙𝑒𝑔𝑒 + 𝛽9 𝑀𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟 ′ 𝑠ℎ𝑜𝑢𝑟𝑙𝑦 𝑤𝑎𝑔𝑒
+ 𝛽10 𝑂𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟 𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒(𝑓𝑎𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟 ′ 𝑠 𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑛𝑜𝑛𝑙𝑎𝑏𝑜𝑟 𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒)
+ 𝛽11 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑠 𝑎𝑠 𝑓𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑒 ℎ𝑒𝑎𝑑 𝑜𝑓 ℎ𝑜𝑢𝑠𝑒ℎ𝑜𝑙𝑑 + 𝜀𝑖
The author then uses the estimates for αi as a parameter in a model to predict the
years of schooling a child will have based on maternal childcare received before leaving
the home.
𝑆𝑐ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑖 = 𝑋𝑖 𝛿1 + 𝛿2 𝛼𝑖 + 𝜀3𝑖
Schooling of a child is a function of maternal childcare estimated above and the vector Xi
which includes years of both father’s and mother’s years of schooling, whether the father
was a white collar worker during the period, mean real family income, whether the
mother was less than 19 when she birthed the first child, whether the parents expected
their child to attend college, number of siblings, and maternal employment. The last two
variables are commonly used proxies for childcare time spent by mothers. To avoid
inconsistency and bias with ordinary least square estimates, an instrumental variable
approach was used in the multiple regression analysis. However, the differences in errors
between OLS and IV are found to be insignificant.
Datcher-Loury (1988) concludes that maternal childcare time increases with
maternal home productivity and decreases with rising opportunity costs of increasing
potential wages. The author also concludes that maternal childcare time increases
children’s years of schooling supported by statistical evidence. This paper limits the
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dataset to mothers who have at least twelve years of schooling. The outcomes found in
this paper may differ because of variance in maternal home productivity across
educational groups. The fourth conclusion is that the existence of sibling children in the
same age group or one age group older has negative effects on the years of schooling for
a particular child. However, these findings are generally small and nearly statistically
insignificant.
Kohler, Behrman, and Skytthe (2005) explain that both being in partnerships with
a significant other and having children increases utility to the parents. To do this, the
authors analyze the debate on the validity of conceptual framework that states: “Partner +
Children = Happiness.” This framework makes two key assumptions, the first is that
agents do not have misconceptions about the impacts of partnerships and fertility on their
happiness, and the second is that these agents make conscious and informed decisions
when it comes to these choices. By fertility, the authors note that there is an emphasis on
biological children, not those attained from adoption or any other avenue. The above
simple equation is challenged on the grounds that happiness is primarily determined by
genetic factors that affect personality and other predispositions. Proponents on this side
of the debate, typically psychologists, argue that chance events severely affect happiness,
but do not persist to affect long-run happiness. That is to say that happiness is relatively
stable over an individual’s lifetime, but there are deviations based on life events that
affect only the short-run.
The authors of this paper control for data limitations by using a dataset from
Denmark that includes monozygotic twins that were asked survey questions about their
relative well-being and their socioeconomics and demographic experiences. This dataset
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is used to control for certain unobserved endowments and genetic predispositions that
would affect happiness were the respondents genetically different. Based on this, causal
interpretations can be made from the data on the relative well-being of agents based on
their partnership status and if they have children.
The data used in from the Danish Twin Registry, a nationwide database
established in 1954 and the first in the world. The Registry conducted a survey in 2002
on twins that were born between the years on 1931 and 1982 addressing issues of health,
socioeconomic characteristics, number of biological children and age at which the parent
had their first child, and partnership behaviors including the number of and age at which
the respondent was married. The survey was arranged to measure subjective well-being
by having the respondents rank their satisfaction with their lives from “very satisfied” to
“not satisfied at all” for two different age groups, 25 to 45 and 50 to 70 years of age. The
authors use these two age groups to demonstrate categories of individuals who are and
are not in their childbearing years. The authors note that Scandinavian countries have
decreased the importance of the distinction between marriage and cohabitation, and the
twin survey treats the two relationship arrangements the same under the name
“partnership” in the data.
A problem in estimating causal relationships between partnerships and fertility on
happiness is that unobserved endowments may be endogenous. Using the twin dataset,
the authors are able to control for the unobserved endowments using a differential
approach in their regression equation from one twin to the other. The authors argue that
twins share the same genetic endowments and socioeconomic upbringing that affect
emotional predispositions to happiness. This way, the causal effects of differences in
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partnership arrangements and fertility on subjective happiness is exogenous in multiple
regression analysis. The model for twin i in pair j is as follows:
𝐻𝑎𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑗 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 𝑃𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑗 + 𝛽2 𝐹𝑒𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖𝑗 + 𝜇𝑗 + 𝜀𝑖𝑗
where Partner refers to partnership behavior of twin i, and Fertility refers to fertility
behavior of twin i, µ is the unobserved endowments that are common to twins in pair j,
and ε is a randomly distributed variable that reflects other unobserved factors of
happiness not described in the regression equation. The differential regression equation is
then as follows:
𝛥𝐻𝑎𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑗 = 𝛽1 𝛥𝑃𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑗 + 𝛽2 𝛥𝐹𝑒𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑗 + 𝜀𝑗
where the Δ terms are differentials in twin pair j. Without using a differential approach,
the estimates of β1 and β2 are biased, especially in survey data.
Kohler, Behrman, and Skytthe (2005) conclude that parental happiness is
influenced little by the normal variables such as income, education, and occupation.
Instead, happiness seems to depend most on personality characteristics, genetic
predispositions, and socioeconomic background. Partnership status is a primary aspect of
subjective happiness for both men and women in both age ranges. An important finding,
first-born children have a larger effect on subjective happiness of parents than subsequent
children. Also, fertility does not seem to affect the happiness gained by parents from their
partnership arrangement. The authors note that first-born children before the parents’ age
of 21 reduces subjective happiness in the long run.
Kenney (2008) demonstrates that children in households with pooled income from
both a mother and a father are less likely to experience food insecurity when the finances
are exclusively allocated by the mother. The author bridges a gap in the literature where
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the gender of the parent who controls the household finances is a determining factor of
the food security of the children in that household. Data for this study comes from two
components of the Fragile Families Child Wellbeing study: the Core Survey and the InHome Survey.
Kenney (2008) answers two test questions, the first being whether children are
more or less food secure when the mother controls the finances in low-income and
moderate-income two-parent households in the United States. The second question is a
test that measures sensitivity in a child’s food security to their father’s involvement in the
allocation of finances. The author notes that there are two possible reasons for variations
in food security based on the gender of the parent who controls the finances. The first is
that opposite-gendered parents make different choices in the type of food they buy,
particularly children’s food. A father may be have less knowledge of what types of childspecific foods are needed to best provide nutrition to children, leading to a quality
deficiency in the food that is purchased. Alternatively, fathers may simply misallocate the
appropriate amount of household resources to food, leaving a quantity deficiency for the
children to eat.
Multiple regression analysis is used to test the author’s hypotheses that gender
matters in resource allocation of household resources for food security subject to the
following models:
𝐴𝑛𝑦 𝑐ℎ𝑖𝑙𝑑 𝑓𝑜𝑜𝑑 𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑒𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑦
= 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 𝑴𝒂𝒏𝒂𝒈𝒆𝒎𝒆𝒏𝒕 𝒐𝒇 𝒉𝒐𝒖𝒔𝒆𝒉𝒐𝒍𝒅 𝒓𝒆𝒔𝒐𝒖𝒓𝒄𝒆𝒔
+ 𝛽2 𝑯𝒐𝒖𝒔𝒆𝒉𝒐𝒍𝒅 𝒄𝒉𝒂𝒓𝒂𝒄𝒕𝒆𝒓𝒊𝒔𝒕𝒊𝒄𝒔 + 𝛽3 𝑴𝒐𝒕𝒉𝒆𝒓′ 𝒔 𝒄𝒉𝒂𝒓𝒂𝒄𝒕𝒆𝒓𝒊𝒔𝒕𝒊𝒄𝒔
+ 𝛽4 𝑭𝒂𝒕𝒉𝒆𝒓′ 𝒔 𝒄𝒉𝒂𝒓𝒂𝒄𝒕𝒆𝒓𝒊𝒔𝒕𝒊𝒄𝒔 + 𝜀
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𝐶ℎ𝑖𝑙𝑑 𝑓𝑜𝑜𝑑 𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑒𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥 =
= 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 𝑴𝒂𝒏𝒂𝒈𝒆𝒎𝒆𝒏𝒕 𝒐𝒇 𝒉𝒐𝒖𝒔𝒆𝒉𝒐𝒍𝒅 𝒓𝒆𝒔𝒐𝒖𝒓𝒄𝒆𝒔
+ 𝛽2 𝑯𝒐𝒖𝒔𝒆𝒉𝒐𝒍𝒅 𝒄𝒉𝒂𝒓𝒂𝒄𝒕𝒆𝒓𝒊𝒔𝒕𝒊𝒄𝒔 + 𝛽3 𝑴𝒐𝒕𝒉𝒆𝒓′ 𝒔 𝒄𝒉𝒂𝒓𝒂𝒄𝒕𝒆𝒓𝒊𝒔𝒕𝒊𝒄𝒔
+ 𝛽4 𝑭𝒂𝒕𝒉𝒆𝒓′ 𝒔 𝒄𝒉𝒂𝒓𝒂𝒄𝒕𝒆𝒓𝒊𝒔𝒕𝒊𝒄𝒔 + 𝜀
The author first determines the existence, if any, of food insecurity based on the
first equation. Then the extent of the food insecurity is determined in the second equation
using the standard USDA children’s food security scale as the dependent variable, a
continuous measure demonstrating the severity of food insecurity of a child. All the
variable names listed in the equations above are vectors containing groupings of related
variables. Management of household resources represents five dummy variables that
determine which parent controls the household resources and the extent to which there is
joint control. Household characteristics represents the household-poverty ratio, material
hardship index, if the household is receiving WIC or food stamps, the proportion of the
household income attributed to the mother, if the parents are cohabitating, the number of
adults in the household, the number of children in the household, and the relationship
quality index. Mother’s characteristics represents age, race, foreign born, existence of
substance abuse, and existence of a child(ren) with another partner. Father’s
characteristics represents the existence of substance abuse, existence of a child(ren) with
another partner, existence of violence toward mother, and extent of involvement in
childcare.
Kenney (2008) concludes that the probability of a child experiencing food
insecurity is more likely in low-income and moderate-income households when the father
makes allocation decisions, either in full or in part. The results of this study support with
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statistical evidence that children are more likely to be food secure when the mother
makes resource allocation decisions autonomously from the father. In some model
variants, the likelihood of food insecurity is 2.5 times as high when the father is the
exclusive decision maker.
The author notes that women, particularly in the United States, are perceived as
being held more accountable for food than men. This study supports this gender
stereotype with statistical evidence. Mothers are more likely to spend money on food
when they are making allocation decisions, leading to greater food security for the
children in the household. The author expected to find that increasing the father’s
involvement in childcare would increase food security, but the results did not support this
hypothesis. Kenney (2008) reasons that fathers often engage in childcare activities of
young children to keep them out of the way of the mother while she is engaging in food
preparation, meaning that gender roles in the household still point to the mother bearing
most of the burden of providing food security. The author acknowledges a shortcoming in
the dataset as it only includes heterosexual parents living in urban areas with at least one
preschool age child that the parents care for jointly. A possible extension of this paper
would be to examine particular food subsidy programs that focus on nutrition of children
so that even when the father makes allocation decision, the probability of food insecurity
is decreased.
Frongillo, Jyota, and Jones (2006) aim to determine if participation in the Food
Stamp Program (FSP) leads to outcomes in a child’s performance in school and health,
namely reading, mathematics, weight gain, and social skills. The FSP is one of several
federal food assistance programs in the United States, the main goal of which is to reduce
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food insecurity. The authors note that participation in these subsidy programs is by selfselection and it is therefore difficult to distinguish between a causal effect of the
programs that would reduce food insecurity and the selection effects of choosing to be a
participant. Longitudinal data over a four year period of childhood development is used
in the place of cross-sectional data in order to tease out the magnitudes of the causal and
selection effects and reduce bias.
Data for this study comes from the Early Childhood Longitudinal StudyKindergarten cohort from 1998 to 1999, which is a nationally representative sample for
analysis. The USDA’s Household Food Security Survey Module is used as the measure
for food insecurity. Mathematics and reading scores were measured in kindergarten and
again in the third grade. Heights and weights were also recorded. Social skills were
measured using teacher evaluations of the children for a variety of behaviors that capture
social skills, learning abilities, and self-control. The authors employ a differential model
to test their hypotheses based on the following equations:
∆𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒3−𝐾 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 ∆𝒄𝒐𝒗𝒂𝒓𝒊𝒂𝒕𝒆𝒔3−𝐾 + 𝛽2 ∆𝑓𝑜𝑜𝑑 𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑒𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑦3−𝐾
+ 𝛽3 ∆𝐹𝑆𝑃 𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑝𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛3−𝐾 + 𝐸
∆𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒3−𝐾 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 ∆𝒄𝒐𝒗𝒂𝒓𝒊𝒂𝒕𝒆𝒔3−𝐾 + 𝛽2 ∆𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑒 𝑛𝑒𝑒𝑑3−𝐾
+ 𝛽3 ∆𝐹𝑆𝑃 𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑝𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛3−𝐾 + 𝛽4 ∆𝐹𝑆𝑃 𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑝𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛3−𝐾
∗ ∆𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑒 𝑛𝑒𝑒𝑑3−𝐾 + 𝐸
The composite need in the second equation is a continuous measure for material
hardship, and β4 is the coefficient for the interaction term between participation in the
Food Stamp Program and material hardship. Covariates is a vector representing the
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differentials in reading and mathematics scores, height and weight, and social skill
development measures.
Frongillo, Jyota, and Jones (2006) conclude that children in households that
started to engage in FSP participation had less weight gain than children in households
that had ceased FSP participation, contrary to the expected result of the authors.
However, this result is not statistically significant. The results show an increase in
academic measures of children participating in FSP. The authors reason that this could be
the result of improved quality or quantity of nutritious food. However, there is not
enough evidence to support a causal relationship between FSP participation and better
nutrition, only that FSP increases the availability of nutritional substances.
Nord and Golla (2009) estimate the effects of the Supplemental Nutritional
Assistance Program (SNAP), previously FSP, on the food security of those participating
in the program. The authors note that there is a data anomaly whereby food insecurity is
more prevalent in households that participate in SNAP than other qualifying households
that do not. They reason that those households that enroll in SNAP are more likely to
enroll when they are in desperate in their need for food and these observations are not
taken into account by econometricians and data analysts. Nord and Golla (2009) claim to
provide, in greater detail, information on the timing of household enrollment in SNAP
based on their level of food insecurity at the time of their initial participation. To handle
this selection data issue, the authors analyze the months following enrollment into SNAP
instead of before.
Data for this study comes from USDA food security surveys with supplementary
sections to the Current Population Survey conducted by the U.S. Census Bureau from
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2001 to 2006. The authors hypothesize that SNAP eases the burden of food insecurity in
the months after beginning enrollment in the subsidy. Each household is assessed over a
two year period in order to decompose the timing effects of self-selection into the
program. Statistical tests are performed using logistic regression with food insecurity of
each year, respectively, as dependent variables to determine if SNAP reduced food
insecurity over the time of enrollment. The authors note that SNAP enrollment may have
seasonal pattern that would distort the results, so the model uses household member
composition and annual household income as controls.
𝐹𝑜𝑜𝑑 𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑒𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 1
= 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 𝑀𝑜𝑛𝑡ℎ𝑠 𝑏𝑒𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑒 𝑆𝑁𝐴𝑃 + 𝛽2 𝑀𝑜𝑛𝑡ℎ𝑠 𝑏𝑒𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑒 𝑆𝑁𝐴𝑃2
+ 𝛽3 𝑯𝒐𝒖𝒔𝒆𝒉𝒐𝒍𝒅 𝒄𝒐𝒎𝒑𝒐𝒔𝒊𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 + 𝛽4 𝑯𝒐𝒖𝒔𝒆𝒉𝒐𝒍𝒅 𝒊𝒏𝒄𝒐𝒎𝒆 + 𝜀
𝐹𝑜𝑜𝑑 𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑒𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 2
= 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 𝑀𝑜𝑛𝑡ℎ𝑠 𝑏𝑒𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑒 𝑆𝑁𝐴𝑃 + 𝛽2 𝑀𝑜𝑛𝑡ℎ𝑠 𝑏𝑒𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑒 𝑆𝑁𝐴𝑃2
+ 𝛽3 𝑯𝒐𝒖𝒔𝒆𝒉𝒐𝒍𝒅 𝒄𝒐𝒎𝒑𝒐𝒔𝒊𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 + 𝛽4 𝑯𝒐𝒖𝒔𝒆𝒉𝒐𝒍𝒅 𝒊𝒏𝒄𝒐𝒎𝒆 + 𝜀
Household composition is a vector that represents the number of adults in the
household, and the number of children in the household, and the absence of either parent.
Household income is a vector that represents different levels of income as a percentage to
the poverty line.
Nord and Golla (2009) conclude that food insecurity increases for households
seven or eight months leading up to their entry to the SNAP program. After enrolling in
SNAP, drastic food insecurity decreased, but then remained stable for the next ten
months. This demonstrates the self-selection hypothesis and a causal relationship
between decreasing food insecurity and SNAP enrollment. The authors note that there is
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a possibility that the causal relationship may be threatened if SNAP acts as a marker for
households that have recently experienced drastic food insecurity. These marked
households may experience an increase in food security due to some other externality
associated with being enrolled in the SNAP program or that their food insecurity function
has a positive first derivative and a negative second derivative after becoming
participants in the program.
Burgstahler, Gundersen, and Garasky (2012) seek to determine if SNAP
participation increases obesity in children to those enrolled in the program. This study
expands on previous studies because it controls for household financial stress, which can
be a cause of childhood obesity. Financial stress, the authors argue, causes changes in the
behavior of the parents and alters the environment in which children develop. Gatasky et
al. (2009) demonstrate that exposure to household stress is correlated with childhood
obesity by avenues of subconscious psychological responses that influence changes in
diet and exercise. One of the hypotheses of this study is that participation in SNAP
reduces the amount of household level financial stress that can negatively affect children
and in turn cause weight gain. The model is as follows using two-stage least square
multiple regression methodology:
𝐶ℎ𝑖𝑙𝑑ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑑 𝑜𝑏𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖𝑗 = 𝛼 + 𝛽𝑆𝑁𝐴𝑃𝑖∗ + 𝜆𝐹𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙 𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑖 + 𝛾𝑿𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖
and
𝑆𝑁𝐴𝑃𝑖 = 𝛼 + 𝜆𝐹𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙 𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑖 + 𝛾𝒁𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖
The data for this study comes from the Survey of Household Finances and
Childhood Obesity in 2009 to 2010, a survey which focuses particularly on financial
stress. The observations are composed of low-income metro and non-metro counties in
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Illinois, Iowa, and Michigan. Survey data are collected in two phases, first by phone
interviews and second by mailed surveys measuring height and weight of children of
households participating in SNAP. The authors note that this dataset is useful because it
has stratified levels of financial stress, county level SNAP participation rates, and
children’s height, weight, and a derivation of body mass index percentiles. The measure
of financial stress is derived from the survey data with six specific objective questions
about day-to-day living limited to time spent in the household. This makes for discrete
measures of financial stress (from 1 to 6), which are then used as weights for the stress
experience.
The authors use geographic information from the dataset about the county of
residence for particular participants in SNAP as an instrumental variable for the SNAP
variable in the analysis. Their reasoning is that high SNAP participation rates for a
particular county ought to be highly correlated with an individual household’s decision to
enroll in SNAP because the level of the negative stigma associated with receiving food
subsidies is diminished relative to that in counties with low SNAP participation rates.
Also, there would be more outreach of the SNAP program in counties with high
participation and more availability of information about the program and receiving of its
benefits. SNAP participation rates are affected greatly by factors such as unemployment
rate, median income, percentage of population in respective minorities, and county-level
need for food subsidies to decrease food insecurity. These are also used as controls in the
model.
The vectors X and Z refer to standard sets of covariates that are common in
literature including education level, household income, health insurance status, race,
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ethnicity, household size, and marital status. The sample data are restricted to households
that qualify to receive SNAP benefits, however, not all qualifying households will choose
to enroll for the SNAP program. Because the study is on children in particular, the
authors also remove observations where the only children in qualifying households are
under the age of two as there is no general consensus about how to uniformly measure
body mass index in children of that age. Before drawing conclusions, the authors test the
validity of their instrumental variables for SNAP. Based on the Sargan chi-squared
statistic and the Basmann chi-squared statistic, the tests provide no statistical evidence
that the chosen instruments are invalid or introduce endogeneity.
Burgstahler, Gundersen, and Garasky (2012) conclude that SNAP participation is
negatively associated with obesity in children in low-income households in counties in
Illinois, Iowa, and Michigan. These results are found both before and after controlling for
household financial stress. This study was pursued in response to other studies done that
showed evidence suggesting that SNAP led to childhood obesity, but these results show
evidence to disprove those assertions and support the opposite claim, that SNAP
enrollment decreases childhood obesity for participating households. The authors note
possible extensions would be to consider the relationships between financial stress using
longitudinal data to tease out dynamic relationships over time. This research would be
enriched by using a larger dataset with more observations from a larger geographic
region. Lastly, the dataset used in this study was limited to those households that would
likely be experiencing financial stress. The get a more general picture, the data should be
allowed to include observations from households that are not perceived by the researchers
as being predisposed to financial stress.
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Nord and Prell (2011) aim to demonstrate that food security of households with
incomes within 130% of the poverty level (SNAP eligible) increased from 2008 to 2009
with most of the increase attributed to the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of
2009. To conduct their study, the authors analyze data on SNAP participation, food
insecurity, household spending on food, and household characteristics from the Current
Population Survey (CPS) Food Security Supplement (FSS). The annual FSS survey
augments the monthly CPS survey conducted by the USDA. The survey is administered
by the U.S. Census Bureau. In 2009, 46,000 households participated in the survey and
consisted of civilian, noninstitutionalized people in the United States. The following table
shows how monthly SNAP benefits are increased by ARRA from 2008 to 2009 from
Nord and Prell (2011).
Table 5. Maximum Monthly SNAP benefits pre-ARRA and post-ARRA

Number of
People in the
SNAP
Household
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8

Pre-ARRA in
fiscal 2009
$176
$323
$463
$588
$698
$838
$926
$1,058

Arra increase
in mazimum
Post-ARRA
monthly SNAP
benefits
$200
$24
$367
$44
$526
$63
$668
$80
$793
$95
$952
$114
$1,052
$126
$1,202
$144

Data on SNAP participation, SNAP benefits, food spending, and food security in
December 2009 are compared to the corresponding statistics for December 2008. The
2009 data was collected about eight months after ARRA went into effect so there would
be households that would have gone through the eight month survey period completely
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since ARRA was enacted. Several income categories are analyzed in this study including
all low-income households, low-income households that were participating in SNAP, and
households whose income exceeds the maximum for SNAP enrollment but is less than
the U.S. median income. Multivariate regression methods with controls for changes in
income, employment, and other household characteristics are employed to analyze the
partial effects from 2008 to 2009.
The authors examine three interrelated outcomes: SNAP participation, food
expenditures, and food security. These outcomes are then tested for consistency against
the desired outcomes of the ARRA increases to SNAP. The effects of the low-income
households are compared to the effects of households that the authors define as “near
SNAP eligible”, meaning that their income exceeds 150% of the poverty line but does not
exceed 250% of the poverty line. In this way, the near SNAP eligible households are not
low-income but are still well below the national median income. The authors analyze data
from 2001 to 2009 to capture some pre-recession data as well as post-ARRA data for a
broad cross-section of economic environmental factors. Data complications occur in the
form of the self-selection bias inherent with SNAP enrollment and under-reporting of
SNAP participation of households enrolled due to the perceived negative stigma of
receiving SNAP benefits.
The key variables in this study are income, low-income and near-SNAP-eligible
status, SNAP participation, Thrifty Food Plan-adjusted food expenditures, and food
security. Unadjusted multivariate comparisons are used and employ medians instead of
means because medians provide more robust measurement errors, which is particularly
relevant to food expenditure data. These are mostly used as a naïve baseline. Adjusted
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multivariate comparisons are used to account for any household-specific circumstances
independent of ARRA’s increase to SNAP benefits from year to year. These models
control for income, employment and labor force status, household composition and
structure, presence of an elderly person(s), race and ethnicity, citizenship status,
education level of the most highly educated adult in the household, metropolitan
residential status, and geographic region. Difference-in-difference comparisons are also
employed in this study to control for factors that are not-household specific from year to
year independent of ARRA’s increase to SNAP benefits. The authors note that a change
in food prices could affect food security to a household but would have nothing to do
with the household specifically, thus skewing the results.
Nord and Prell (2011) conclude that food security of low-income households
improved from 2008 to 2009. Their results suggest that ARRA’s increase to SNAP
benefits was a substantial factor for the decrease in food insecurity between the two years
in the study. This result is further supported because households with income that
exceeds the level of SNAP eligibility did not see a decrease in food insecurity between
2008 and 2009. Another conclusion of this study is that SNAP enrollment demonstrates a
decrease in food insecurity. The authors decomposed the changes in food security related
to SNAP enrollment between two factors that work in opposing directions. Firstly, there
is a self-selection bias to SNAP enrollment. Second, households with a greater disparity
between their resources and their needs are more likely to enroll in SNAP to diminish the
gap to cover their needs. Because of these two forces, the evidence that ARRA decreased
food insecurity to those enrolled in SNAP is to be considered a vast improvement in the
effectiveness of the program. The authors note that their findings question the adequacy
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of SNAP benefits before ARRA because of the large, positive effect suggested by the
study that ARRA had on reducing food insecurity. The authors suggest that “adequacy” is
difficult to define with a national food supplement program as different regions have
different local food prices, different household needs, and each household’s capacity to
manage their resources is different. However, the overall conclusion is that SNAP
benefits prior to 2009 still have a substantial benefit to households who received SNAP
benefits.
In aggregate, the literature supports that childcare is important, not only to the
well-being of the children, as cited in Gustafsson and Stafford (1992), but also in the
level of market output that the parents provide, as supported by Tekin (2007) and Berger
and Black (1992). Hill and Stafford (1980) demonstrate that the quality of childcare
greatly affects the potential market participation and output of children, so a high
standard of childcare is important to the ability of children to become productive
members of society in adulthood. Datcher-Loury (1988) supports the findings of Hill and
Stafford (1980) and shows that not only does quality childcare allow for productivity
increases later in life, but when the mother is the primary childcare provider, her
nonmarket productivity increases. Kohler, Behrman, and Skytthe (2005) demonstrate that
children are positive attributes to the utility of parents.
Food insecurity can be reduced, as demonstrated by Nord and Golla (2009) and
Nord and Prell (2011), by enrollment in the Supplemental Nutritional Assistance
Program, both before and after 2009, and by the mother of the household making
resource allocation decisions as it comes to food based on the findings of Kenney (2008).
Not only can food insecurity be reduced by enrollment in SNAP, formerly the Food
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Stamp Program, but the nutritional value of the food available to children in this program
increases as demonstrated by Frongillo, Jyota, and Jones (2006). In addition to Frongillo,
et al. (2006), Burgstahler, Gundersen, and Garasky (2012) provide statistical evidence
that SNAP enrollment is negatively associated with childhood obesity to those children
enrolled. Overall, childcare is important, which can be augmented with a subsidy like
SNAP in order to provide food security and increased nutritional availability to children.
No previous research examines the effect of SNAP enrollment directly on nonpecuniary household resource allocation decisions, including the childcare provided to
children by household adults. This paper contributes by showing a positive statistical
relationship between enrollment in SNAP and nonmarket work done by parents that
benefits children in the household.
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CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK
Consider that individual households have utility functions that are an aggregation
of the utility of all household members that are increasing in consumption and leisure:
𝑈 = 𝑓(𝐶, 𝐿)
This utility function U is optimized by the household in order to maximize utility,
constrained by the household’s budget constraint:
𝐶 = 𝑤(𝑇 − 𝐿) + 𝑉
where C is consumption by the household of goods spent in dollars, T is total hours in the
time period of the analysis, L is hours of leisure, w is the wage rate, and V is other
household income earned in (T-L) hours. Other household income includes infusions, like
subsidies, to the household’s income. The constraint is increasing in V. Thus, any other
income shifts the budget constraint out, allowing for greater levels of consumption and
leisure when the model is solved. Leisure hours also include non-market activities, work
or otherwise. To be a non-market work activity, the household agent does not receive a
wage for work being done, typically household work. Rearranging the budget constraint
yields the following equation:
𝑤𝑇 + 𝑉 = 𝐶 + 𝑤𝐿
This algebraic transformation is useful because it shows how much a household
would produce in terms of wages if all available hours were used for work. This rewritten
budget constraint also shows that every hour of leisure costs w, the wage rate. The
constrained maximization problem can be solved using a Lagrange multiplier approach:
𝑚𝑎𝑥Ω = 𝑈(𝐶, 𝐿) + 𝜆(𝑤𝑇 + 𝑉 − 𝐶 − 𝑤𝐿)
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However, there may also exist a perceived negative stigma from SNAP enrollment which
diminished the utility of the household. Since the stigma, W, is dependent on SNAP
enrollment, W is a function of SNAP. The stigma is added to the Langrangian as follows:
𝑚𝑎𝑥Ω = 𝑈(𝐶, 𝐿) − 𝑊(𝑆) + 𝜆(𝑤𝑇 + 𝑉 − 𝐶 − 𝑤𝐿)
It is important to note that households can have more than one wage-receiving
agent. These cases can be expanded mathematically to accommodate that different
household agents can receive differing wage rates by adjusting the household budget
constraint, but the process to the solution remains the same. The Lagrangian method
chooses the levels of consumption and leisure that maximize household utility subject to
the budget constraint. It stands to reason that neither using all hours for work nor using
all hours for leisure optimizes the objective function.
In order to have money for consumption, agents in a household need to do market
work in order to earn a wage. Working, in itself, is assumed to provide disutility to
agents, who derive their utility from the consumption the working provides. The
assumption that work provides disutility would not hold if the agents experience greater
utility from working than from the wages their hours working provide.
The utility function for households can be expanded to accommodate the
inclusion of household children and is as follows:
𝑈 = 𝑓[𝐶, 𝐿, 𝑊𝐵(𝐶, 𝐿)]
where WB is the well-being of the household children, defined as follows:
𝑊𝐵 = 𝑓(𝐶, 𝐿)
WB is a function of C, household consumption, and L, the amount of leisure
household adults spend on household children. Children attain a higher state of well-
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being as more nonmarket hours of the household’s adults are spent on them. For this
reason, the household utility function for households with children is increasing in WB.
Next, consider a household with children that receives a subsidy in the form of
SNAP benefits, the constraint is the same except S is added to V to specify that at least
part of other income in the constraint is in the form of a subsidy.
𝐶 = 𝑤(𝑇 − 𝐿) + 𝑉 + 𝑆
Receiving a subsidy eases the household budget constraint and allows a
household to achieve a greater level of utility in equilibrium since the constraint is
increasing in both V and S. The constrained maximization problem is again solved with
the Lagrange multiplier approach with the expanded objective function and the rewritten
budget constraint:
𝑚𝑎𝑥Ω = 𝑈[𝐶, 𝐿, 𝑊𝐵(𝐶, 𝐿)] − 𝑊(𝑆) + 𝜆(𝑤𝑇 + 𝑉 + 𝑆 − 𝐶 − 𝑤𝐿)
The central question in this framework is how the well-being variable in
households with children is affected when at least part of other income is in the form on a
subsidy. More narrowly, how does receiving SNAP benefits, a subsidy, affect the wellbeing of children in the household?
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EMPIRICAL MEASUREMENT
The data for this analysis are from the American Time Use Survey (ATUS)
merged with data from the Current Population Survey Food Security Supplement (CPS)
using years 2005 to 2013. Both of these surveys are conducted by the Bureau of Labor
Statistics (BLS). The Food Security Supplement portion of the CPS collects information
regarding household food expenditure, food assistance participation, food security, ways
that households cope with food security, and household concern about food insecurity.
The universe for the CPS includes households that are above 185% of the poverty
line and below. Households that are deemed to be food insecure are then asked the
supplementary questions pertaining specifically to food. Interviewers direct their
questions toward the member of the household who buys and prepares the food, if
possible. There are approximately 60,000 households that are surveyed every month.
About one-eighth of the households exit the sample each month after their eighth CPS
interview attempt.
ATUS aims to measure how Americans divide their time during a typical day for
all of life’s activities. One such activity that people spend time on is childcare.
Demographic information is also attained during the survey process. ATUS covers all
American residents that are at least fifteen years of age, excluding active military and
those institutionalized in nursing homes, permanent rehabilitation facilities, and prisons.
The ATUS sample is drawn from the CPS so the universe for the two datasets is the
same.
The ATUS sample is a three-stage stratified selection process from the CPS. The
first selection stage is a reduction of the CPS oversample in the less-populated states. The
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CPS has a reliability requirement for each state, meaning that less-populated states are
allocated a larger proportion of the national CPS sample than they would get with
national reliability requirement. This increases the reliability of the estimates at both state
and national levels. ATUS does not have a state reliability requirement. To improve the
efficiency of the national estimates, the CPS sample is subsampled to derive the ATUS
sample which is distributed across states approximately equal to the proportion of the
national population each state represents.
The second selection stage stratifies households based on various demographic
characteristics of the households including race/ethnicity, age and presence of children,
and the number of adults in households without children. Sampling rates vary across
strata. To increase the reliability of time-use data, the eligible households with a Hispanic
or non-Hispanic black households are oversampled. To ensure appropriate measures of
childcare, households with children are also oversampled. To accommodate the
oversampling of households with children, households without children are
undersampled.
In the final selection stage, an eligible person from each household selected from
the second stage is randomly selected to be the designated person for ATUS. Eligibility is
defined as a member of a civilian household at least 15 years of age. All eligible persons
within a sample household have an equal probability of being selected as the designated
person for ATUS.
After 2003, the ATUS sample was reduced by 35% in order to bring costs down
to an acceptable amount based on the annual survey budget. The same proportion of each
stratum was removed in order to make the reduction. This somewhat reduced the
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accuracy of the estimates for the smaller groups, but the precision loss was eased as the
group size increased. Since 2003, response rates have averaged 54.7% on an annual basis.
Secondary activities are defined by ATUS as activities that are done concurrently with a
more important, or primary, activity. With the exception of childcare, no secondary
activities are compiled by the ATUS.
The ATUS, and therefore the CPS, is edited after the raw data collection in order
to produce usable datasets. The most common edit is to deal with item nonresponses,
missing variables in otherwise completed questionnaires. Simply ignoring missing values
leads to biased estimates in analysis. To handle missing data, a response is imputed one
of three ways in order to make full questionnaires and complete datasets. The BLS
discloses that imputation can lead to overstatement of the precision of estimates. The first
imputation method is relational imputation which infers the missing value based on
characteristics from others in the same household. Most commonly, this edit is used to fill
in demographic information. The second imputation method is longitudinal assignments
which uses the final month of CPS data to determine whether a value exists and what
assignment the value should be given. This is typically used on labor force edits. The
final imputation method is hot-deck allocation which implies missing values using
records with similar characteristics. This is similar to relational imputation but not using
data from within the same household and is most commonly used on labor force edits
where longitudinal assignments cannot be used. The edits that are shared by both the CPS
and the ATUS are labor force status edits, industry/occupation edits, and earnings edits.
The edits that differ in the CPS and the ATUS are household demographic edits and
school enrollment edits.
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The subsample used for the regression analysis limits the sample to households
that have household income below 130% of the poverty line for each year in the time
series. Because the poverty line is determined by how many residents are in the
household of a particular respondent, the poverty line increases as the number of
household residents increases. The poverty line also moves depending on the current
economic climate in any particular year. Therefore, respondents with the same number of
residents in their house and the same household income in different years are not
guaranteed to both be part of the subsample in this process. In this paper, the subsample
of those below 130% of the poverty line is coded in STATA© as sample130. This
subsample was chosen because respondents need to be within 130% of the poverty line as
one of the qualifications for receiving SNAP benefits. In order to determine 130% of the
poverty line, the Consumer Price Index (CPI) is used to deflate each year in the time
series using 2013 as the base year.
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MODEL
The dependent variable used in this model is the minutes of daily childcare that
respondents spend in primary childcare with their own children that are living in the same
house and are not classified as adults. Primary childcare is defined by the CPS as time
spent actively participating in activities with children, individuals who are less than 18
years old, or taking care of their basic needs. Changing diapers and playing games with
children are examples of primary childcare. This differs from secondary childcare which
CPS defines as time respondents spend with their children but are not actively engaging
in activities with the child. An example would be watching television while a child plays
in the same room.
The explanatory model employs some basic demographic information as righthand-side variables including age and sex. Age is an integer variable with discrete values.
Sex is coded as a dummy variable where a value of 0 is male and a value of 1 is female.
If these dummy values were to be scaled up by one, they would not affect the
interpretation of the estimates because they would still be binary in nature. Marital status
is included in the model with four interaction variables that incorporate the existence of
children and the involvement of the spouse. Other variables included are employment
status and the existence of multiple jobs. The two are related, but distinctly different.
Clearly, if the employment status of a respondent is unemployed, that same respondent
will not be able to have multiple jobs. It stands to reason that if a respondent does not
have a job, that respondent cannot have more than one job. The income variable is
measured as the midpoint of the stratified categories of the average household income.
Household size is the number of people living in a respondent’s household. The variables
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about employment relate to childcare through the avenue of the need of a respondent to
outsource their childcare to daycare centers. Likewise, the income variable has
explanatory power for respondents’ ability to pay a center for childcare. The summary
statistics are reported in Table 6.
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Table 6. Descriptive Statistics.
Variable
variable name
childcare
snapdoll
age

Definition
STATA© coding
daily childcare
(minutes)
SNAP assistance
($)
age of respondent

0 if male
1 if female
1 if respondent is
marrwsp
married and living with
spouse, 0 otherwise
1 if respondent is
marrwosp
married and living without
spouse, 0 otherwise
1 if respondent is married,
has household,
marrwspchild
children and living
with spouse, 0 otherwise
1 if respondent is married,
has household,
marrwospchild children and living
without spouse, 0
otherwise
0 if employed
empstat
1 if unemployed
2 if not in the labor force
0 if no
multjobs
1 if yes
midpoint of the
categories of the
income
average household income
(in $10,000)
number of people living
hhsize
in respondent's
household
ARRA assistance
ARRA1
0 if year<2009, 1
otherwise
sex

Full Sample
N
Mean
(Std.Dev.)
31.7635
1,186,760
(79.3943)
14.9589
47,321
(69.6135)
46.5943
1,186,760
(17.6618)
0.5634
1,186,760
(0.4960)
0.4960
1,186,760
(0.5000)

Subsample
N
Mean
(Std.Dev.)
32.6098
783,136
(80.0868)
67.1445
8,317
(136.3850)
46.5241
783,136
(17.6699)
0.5637
783,136
(0.4959)
0.4795
783,136
(0.4996)

0.0142
(0.1183) 783,136

0.0155
(0.1236)

1,186,760

0.2924
783,136
(0.4549)

0.2946
(0.4558)

1,186,760

0.0052
(0.0719) 783,136

0.0057
(0.0753)

1,186,760

0.6965
(0.9261) 783,136

0.7006
(0.9259)

0.0602
783,136
(0.2379)
6.3146
(5.7682) 769,499

0.0597
(0.2370)
6.5266
(6.1356)

1,186,760

1,186,760

1,077,176

56,449

1,186,760

2.7478
(1.5287)

10,424

2.7998
(1.819)

0.3997
(0.4898) 783,136

0.5526
(0.4972)
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The main explanatory variable in this framework is the number of dollars of
SNAP benefits received by respondents. ARRA is a dummy variable for the existence of
the ARRA increase to SNAP benefits. Ultimately, the simple OLS regression equation
takes the form:
𝑐ℎ𝑖𝑙𝑑𝑐𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑖 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 𝑠𝑛𝑎𝑝𝑑𝑜𝑙𝑙 + 𝛽2 𝑎𝑔𝑒 + 𝛽3 𝑠𝑒𝑥 + 𝛽4 𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑟𝑤𝑠𝑝 + 𝛽5 𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑟𝑤𝑜𝑠𝑝
+ 𝛽6 𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑟𝑤𝑠𝑝𝑐ℎ𝑖𝑙𝑑 + 𝛽7 𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑟𝑤𝑜𝑠𝑝𝑐ℎ𝑖𝑙𝑑 + 𝛽8 𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡 + 𝛽9 𝑚𝑢𝑙𝑡𝑗𝑜𝑏𝑠
+ 𝛽10 ℎℎ𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒 + 𝛽11 𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒 + 𝜀𝑖
where β0 is the constant and εi is the error term. Any β > 0 will increase average expected
minutes of daily childcare while any β < 0 will decrease average expected minutes of
daily childcare. Based on the hypothesis that SNAP will increase childcare, β1 > 0 is
expected. Because the dependent variable is measured in minutes and the main
explanatory variables are measured in dollars, small coefficients are expected since the
incremental values of the variables are small. The interpretation of the main explanatory
variables then is that an increase of $1 in subsidies changes daily childcare minutes by
the β coefficient’s magnitude.
The interaction variables are multiplicative products of different dummy variables
related to childcare. In this framework, the interaction variables are marrwsp, marrwosp,
marrwspchild, and marrwospchild. Marrwsp is defined as a respondent being married and
the spouse is present in the household. Marrwosp is defined as a respondent being
married and the spouse is absent from the household. Marrwspchild and marrwospchild
follow the same definition except with the inclusion of the presence of household
children. These variables take on a value of 1 if all the components are satisfied for the
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particular interaction set, 0 otherwise. This is because if any one component of the
interaction is unsatisfied, that piece takes on a value of 0 and is multiplied through the
entire variable, resulting in 0. For a particular respondent, some of the interaction
variables may turn to 0. Depending on the sign of the corresponding β coefficient, this
may increase or decrease the respondent’s expected minutes of childcare per day. At this
point, potential data issues will be examined and discussed.
Heteroskedasticity refers to the phenomenon where there is increased variance, σ2,
in the error term, εi, across values of an explanatory variable. Formally,
heteroskedasticity is defined:
𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝜀|𝑥) ≠ 𝜎 2
One of the consequences of heteroskedasticity is incorrect standard errors. Therefore, any
confidence intervals or statistical tests of coefficients are incorrect as well. Because of the
survey structure related to the collection process of the data being used for this model and
with this process of analysis, there is nothing that can be done to fix any
heteroskedasticity if it exists in the data. Using the survey (svy) command in STATA©
implies that the data being used are collected by a survey. Using this particular command,
the error terms are adjusted to accommodate for the survey collection method.
Endogeneity refers to variables that lead to biased and inconsistent estimates for
different reasons. Most prevalent are omitted variables that are relevant to the regression,
measurement errors, and simultaneity. The last refers to a situation where a specific
independent variable explains the dependent variable, but the presumed dependent
variable also explains the independent variable. In other words, the two simultaneously
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explain changes in the other. This causes the estimates in the model to be biased and
inconsistent. One way to correct endogeneity is to use an instrumental variable estimator.
In this study, those who receive SNAP benefits may be deciding to enroll for
reasons that impact childcare simultaneously. First, an adult may be able to sustain
themselves on a limited diet that may not be nutritious. However, a parent may feel as
though their child should not experience food insecurity even if the parent themselves is
capable of doing so. Since SNAP is one way to reduce food insecurity, households with
children, and therefore those that engage in childcare, may be more likely to enroll in
SNAP than households where no children are present. In this way, SNAP enrollment
could be endogenous to a model that estimates childcare.
Another plausible reason why SNAP and childcare are endogenous is that having
more children increases the household’s food demand, which could put strain on the
household’s budget. This could cause some households with many children to fall to a
level of income where they are SNAP eligible. Since there are many children in the
household, the household adults will most likely be spending more time in daily childcare
on average than households with fewer children. In this way, SNAP enrollment may be
endogenous to having many children and engaging in more daily childcare on average.
An instrumental variable, zi, is correlated with the endogenous variable, but is
otherwise exogenous. Good instrumental variables are highly correlated with the
endogenous explanatory variable, xi, and uncorrelated with the error term, ui. In this
paper, the variable that is under suspicion of being endogenous is snapdoll and the
instrument(s) are ARRA and ARRA1. The instruments ARRA and ARRA1 are formally
defined as follows:
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𝐴𝑅𝑅𝐴1 = 0 𝑖𝑓 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟 < 2009
𝐴𝑅𝑅𝐴1 = 1 𝑖𝑓 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟 ≥ 2009
𝐴𝑅𝑅𝐴 = 𝐴𝑅𝑅𝐴1 ∗ 𝑠𝑛𝑎𝑝𝑑𝑜𝑙𝑙
The final condition for instrumental variables is that the instrument does not
belong in the original regression equation. Variables that belong in the regression
equation that are used as instruments introduce omitted variable bias. The formalized
versions of these the relationships are defined as follows:
𝐶𝑜𝑟𝑟(𝑧, 𝑥) ≠ 0
𝐶𝑜𝑟𝑟(𝑧, 𝑢) = 0
If these conditions are met, the instrumental variable is valid. ARRA is related to SNAP
because one part of the ARRA was explicitly to increase the level of SNAP benefits.
Because of this, ARRA and snapdoll should shift in the same direction at the same time.
In addition, ARRA does not have any direct impact on childcare, so it is exogenous to the
model. For these reasons, ARRA is an acceptable instrument for the snapdoll variable in
this study. There are different statistical tests that test for evidence of endogeneity and
valid instrumental variables.
The Hausman test for endogeneity is used in an OLS regression in which
endogeneity is in question. The Hausman test provides statistical evidence a variable is
exogenous. Similar to the Sargan test, the null hypothesis for the Hausman test is
exogeneity and the alternative hypothesis is endogeneity. The assumption in this
endogeneity test is that the variable is exogenous.
In order to perform a Hausman test, the first step is to run the OLS model
including the instrument and the potential endogenous variable as right-hand-side
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variables. Then predict fitted values for the possible endogenous variable and the
residuals from the OLS model. In a second-stage regression, the predicted values for the
potential endogenous variable are used in place of the variable itself. From this point, the
instrument is kept out, the possible endogenous variable is put back into the regression,
and the predicted residuals are used as another right-hand-side variable. A test for
significance of the residual coefficient is a test of exogeneity. The magnitude of the test
statistic in this case is irrelevant for comparison to other models after the p-value is
calculated because of varying degrees of freedom.
The Sargan test for validity is used in a two-stage least square instrumental
variable regression when there are more instrumental variables than potential endogenous
variables. The Sargan test suggests instruments are valid by providing statistical evidence
that they are uncorrelated with the predicted residuals. The null hypothesis for the Sargan
test is that the instrumental variables are uncorrelated with the predicted residuals and are
therefore valid. The alternative hypothesis is that the instrumental variables are correlated
with the predicted residuals, and the estimates they provide are statistically invalid. It is
important to note that because the null hypothesis is validity of the instruments, the
assumption is that the instruments being used in the overidentification are valid.
In order to perform a Sargan test, the first step is to run the OLS model including
the instruments and predict the residual values. These residuals are then regressed on the
same right-hand-side variables as the OLS. In essence, the dependent variable has been
replaced with the predicted residuals. The resulting estimates from this regression are
then tested for statistical significance with a Sargan test statistic. The test determines
whether the reduced form regression estimates are statistically different from zero. The
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degrees of freedom are calculated by subtracting the number of instruments that are
overidentifying the suspected endogenous variable less one for the endogenous variable
itself. In this instance, there are two instrumental variables for one potential endogenous
variable so there is one degree of freedom. The magnitude of the test statistic in this case
is irrelevant for comparison to other models after the p-value is calculated because of
varying degrees of freedom. Though the Sargan test can provide statistical evidence to
support the exogeneity of overidentified instrumental variables, it cannot indicate which
of the instruments is most valid.
There are some shortcomings for the models reported in the previous section.
There are models that include two instrumental variables, ARRA1 and ARRA. The latter
of these two is not used in a separate model as a single instrument because of how it is
defined. Not only does only take on a value of 1 starting in 2009 like ARRA1 does, but it
also only takes on a value of 1 when there is SNAP enrollment. In this way, ARRA is a
function of the potentially endogenous variable:
𝐴𝑅𝑅𝐴 = 𝐴𝑅𝑅𝐴1 ∗ 𝑠𝑛𝑎𝑝𝑑𝑜𝑙𝑙
Therefore, it may not meet the criteria for being an acceptable instrumental variable as it
is not only correlated with the potential endogenous variable but is defined as a function
of the variable it is intended to instrumentalize. This could lead to endogenous correlation
between the instrument and the potentially endogenous variable instead of exogenous
correlation. However, ARRA is included in the analysis and reported in this paper
because of the Sargan test for validity for overidentified 2SLS models. The Sargan test
failed to reject the null hypothesis of valid instruments. Therefore, the overidentified
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model has statistical evidence to show that it is valid, even with one of the instruments
being defined as a function of the potentially endogenous variable snapdoll.
This paper utilizes both an OLS model and a 2SLS model in order to estimate the
partial effect of snapdoll on daily childcare. Based on the Hausman and Sargan tests,
respectively, OLS is statistically valid. Both models are reported in this paper because the
p-values associated with the Hausman and Sargan test statistics are close to the threshold
of statistical significance for rejecting the null hypothesis of exogeneity at the 90%
significance level, or a critical alpha value of α = 0.1. This implies that the statistical
evidence provided by either model is moderate, not strong. Also, the statistical tests,
though they provide evidence that both models are valid, do not suggest which best
portrays the intended partial effect of snapdoll on average daily childcare.
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RESULTS
This chapter reports the results of all the statistical models used for analysis to
investigate the effects on daily childcare, interprets coefficients, and shows which
coefficients were found to be statistically significant. Table 7 lists the results found in the
OLS models, and Table 8 lists the results found in the 2SLS models. Note that in Table 8,
the variable listed snapdoll has been instrumented.
Model 1 in Table 7 is the simplest naive OLS regression relationship between
minutes spent in childcare on a daily basis and the magnitude of SNAP assistance
received by a household. This regression uses the larger sample from the ATUS before
restricting the subsample to only include households that are SNAP eligible based on
household income. The maximum household income for SNAP eligibility is at or below
130% of the poverty line, so the subsample includes households whose income does not
exceed 130% of the poverty line. The coefficient for snapdoll implies that for every
additional dollar of SNAP assistance, the household is able to engage in another
0.0993631 minutes, about six seconds, of childcare per day. Put another way, an
additional $10 of assistance allows for another minute spent in daily childcare, on
average.
Model 2 in Table 7 is the naive OLS regression relationship between minutes
spent in childcare on a daily basis and the magnitude of SNAP assistance received by a
household that is restricted to the subsample which only includes households that are
SNAP eligible based on household income. The coefficient for snapdoll implies that an
additional dollar of SNAP assistance, the household is able to engage in another
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0.1332499 minutes of childcare per day. Put another way, an additional $7.50 of
assistance allows for another minute spent in daily childcare, on average.
Model 3 in Table 7 is the OLS regression which includes all the right-hand-side
independent variables from the general form in the previous section. The coefficient for
snapdoll would imply that for every additional dollar of SNAP assistance, ceteris peribus,
the household is able to engage in another 0.07 minutes of childcare per day. The specific
form as the result of the OLS model is given as follows:
𝑐ℎ𝑖𝑙𝑑𝑐𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑂𝐿𝑆 = 9.251968 + (0.0716397 ∗ 𝑠𝑛𝑎𝑝𝑑𝑜𝑙𝑙) − (0.7339277 ∗ 𝑎𝑔𝑒)
+ (22.42056 ∗ 𝑠𝑒𝑥) − (5.655668 ∗ 𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑟𝑤𝑠𝑝)
− (8.615675 ∗ 𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑟𝑤𝑜𝑠𝑝) + (51.50522 ∗ 𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑟𝑤𝑠𝑝𝑐ℎ𝑖𝑙𝑑)
+ (23.15323 ∗ 𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑟𝑤𝑜𝑠𝑝𝑐ℎ𝑖𝑙𝑑) + (3.382499 ∗ 𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡)
− (13.08805 ∗ 𝑚𝑢𝑙𝑡𝑗𝑜𝑏𝑠) + (3.887812 ∗ ℎℎ𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒) − (3.741196
∗ 𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒)
The coefficient for age implies that an additional year of age of the respondent, ceteris
peribus, the household averages 0.74 fewer minutes of childcare per day than the average
household. The coefficient for sex implies that for female respondents, ceteris peribus,
the household averages 22.42 more minutes of childcare per day than the average
household. The coefficient for marrwsp implies that for households where the
respondents are married, ceteris peribus, the household averages 5.66 fewer minutes of
childcare per day than the average household. The coefficient for marrwosp implies that
for households where the respondents are married but not together, ceteris peribus, the
household averages 8.62 fewer minutes of childcare per day than the average household.
The coefficient for marrwspchild implies that for households where the respondents are
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married and there is at least one child in the home, ceteris peribus, the household
averages 51.51 more minutes of childcare per day than the average household. The
coefficient for marrwospchild implies that for households where the respondents are
married but not together and there is at least one child in the home, ceteris peribus, the
household averages 23.15 more minutes of childcare per day than the average household.
The coefficient for empstat implies that for respondents that are employed, ceteris
peribus, the household averages 3.38 more minutes of childcare per day than the average
household. The coefficient for multjobs implies that for respondents with at least two
jobs, ceteris peribus, the household averages 13.09 minutes fewer of childcare per day
than the average household. The coefficient for hhsize implies that for every additional
person in the household, ceteris peribus, the household averages 3.89 more minutes of
childcare per day than the average household. The coefficient for income would imply
that for every additional dollar in household income, ceteris peribus, the household
averages 3.74 fewer minutes of childcare per day than the average household.
In Model 3, the intercept is statistically significant at the 90% level. Age,
marrwospchild, and income are statistically significant at the 95% level. Snapdoll, sex,
marrwsp, marrwosp, marrwspchild, empstat, multjobs, and hhsize are statistically
significant at the 99% level.
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Table 7. OLS Results.
Variable

(1)
(2)
(3)
30.65662*** 23.85713***
9.251968*
Intercept
(0.37749)
(1.08899)
(5.10838)
0.0993631*** 0.1332499*** 0.0716397***
snapdoll
(0.00530)
(0.01027)
(0.01038)
__
__
-0.7339277**
age
(0.06661)
__
__
22.42056***
sex
(2.06495)
__
__
-5.655668***
marrwsp
(1.43264)
__
______
-8.615675***
marrwosp
(2.65575)
__
__
51.50522***
marrwspchild
(3.74415)
__
__
23.15323**
marrwospchild
(11.91468)
__
__
3.382499***
empstat
(1.31808)
__
__
-13.08805***
multjobs
(4.76407)
__
__
-3.741196**
income
(1.96572)
__
__
3.887812***
hhsize
(0.95487)
n

47,321

8,317

8,317

R-squared

0.0074

0.0488

0.1752

Prob – F

0.0000

0.0000

0.0000

* significant at the 90% level
** significant at the 95% level
***significant at the 99% level

Model 4 in Table 8 is the 2SLS regression which includes all the right-hand-side
independent variables from the general form in the previous section and uses ARRA1 as
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an instrumental variable for snapdoll. The coefficient for snapdoll would imply that for
every additional dollar of SNAP assistance, ceteris peribus, the household averages 0.06
fewer minutes of childcare per day. However, this coefficient is not statistically
significant. The specific form as the result of the 2SLS model is given as follows:
𝑐ℎ𝑖𝑙𝑑𝑐𝑎𝑟𝑒2𝑆𝐿𝑆 = 16.51178 − (0.06163 ∗ 𝑠𝑛𝑎𝑝𝑑𝑜𝑙𝑙) − (0.86168 ∗ 𝑎𝑔𝑒)
+ (25.05667 ∗ 𝑠𝑒𝑥) − (9.73768 ∗ 𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑟𝑤𝑠𝑝)
− (12.59329 ∗ 𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑟𝑤𝑜𝑠𝑝) + (53.75938 ∗ 𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑟𝑤𝑠𝑝𝑐ℎ𝑖𝑙𝑑)
+ (31.46213 ∗ 𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑟𝑤𝑜𝑠𝑝𝑐ℎ𝑖𝑙𝑑) + (4.404867 ∗ 𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡)
− (13.5589 ∗ 𝑚𝑢𝑙𝑡𝑗𝑜𝑏𝑠) + (7.775969 ∗ ℎℎ𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒) − (9.29017 ∗ 𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒)
In Model 4, marrwospchild and income are statistically significant at the 95%
level. Age, sex, marrwsp, marrwosp, marrwspchild, empstat, multjobs, and hhsize are
statistically significant at the 99% level. The main explanatory variable snapdoll is not
statistically significant.
Model 5 in Table 8 is the overidentified 2SLS regression which includes all the
right-hand-side independent variables from the general form in the previous section and
uses ARRA1 and ARRA as instrumental variables for snapdoll. This model is
overidentified because there are two instruments for the same potentially endogenous
variable. The coefficient for snapdoll would imply that for every additional dollar of
SNAP assistance, ceteris peribus, the household averages 0.05 more minutes of childcare
per day. The specific form as the result of the 2SLS model is given as follows:
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𝑐ℎ𝑖𝑙𝑑𝑐𝑎𝑟𝑒2𝑆𝐿𝑆 = 10.46092 + (0.049192 ∗ 𝑠𝑛𝑎𝑝𝑑𝑜𝑙𝑙) − (0.755201 ∗ 𝑎𝑔𝑒)
+ (22.85954 ∗ 𝑠𝑒𝑥) − (6.335431 ∗ 𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑟𝑤𝑠𝑝)
− (9.278053 ∗ 𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑟𝑤𝑜𝑠𝑝) + (51.8806 ∗ 𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑟𝑤𝑠𝑝𝑐ℎ𝑖𝑙𝑑)
+ (24.53688 ∗ 𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑟𝑤𝑜𝑠𝑝𝑐ℎ𝑖𝑙𝑑) + (3.55275 ∗ 𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡)
− (13.16646 ∗ 𝑚𝑢𝑙𝑡𝑗𝑜𝑏𝑠) + (4.53529 ∗ ℎℎ𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒) − (4.665248
∗ 𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒)
In Model 5, marrwospchild and income are statistically significant at the 95% level.
Snapdoll, age, sex, marrwsp, marrwosp, marrwspchild, empstat, multjobs, and hhsize are
statistically significant at the 99% level.
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Table 8. 2SLS Results.
Variable

(4)
16.51178*
Intercept
(7.40024)
-0.063163
Snapdoll
(0.09784)
-0.86168***
age
(0.11457)
25.05667***
sex
(2.96138)
-9.73768***
marrwsp
(3.33772)
12.59329***
marrwosp
(3.99450)
53.75938***
marrwspchild
(4.18495)
31.46213**
marrwospchild
(13.29260)
4.404867***
empstat
(1.49508)
-13.5589***
multjobs
(5.02857)
-9.29017**
income
(4.63204)
7.775969***
hhsize
(3.04084)

(5)
10.46092**
(5.13061)
0.049192***
(0.01322)
-0.755201***
(0.06785)
22.85954***
(2.09715)
-6.335431***
(1.42753)
-9.278053***
(2.65578)
51.8806***
(3.75489)
24.53688**
(11.85374)
3.55275***
(1.32406)
-13.16646***
(4.78152)
-4.665248**
(2.04169)
4.53529***
(0.99538)

n

8317

8317

R-squared

0.1331

0.1740

Prob - F

0.0000

0.0000

* significant at the 90% level
** significant at the 95% level
***significant at the 99% level
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The Hausman test for endogeneity for Model 3 resulted in a universal F-statistic
of 2.0200 with an associated p-value of 0.1558. Since the null hypothesis is exogeneity,
this test failed to reject the null hypothesis at the 90% significance level. The conclusion
is that there is statistical evidence to show that snapdoll is exogenous in OLS Model 3.
The Sargan test for validity for the overidentified Model 5 resulted in a Sarganstatistic of 2.2349 with an associated p-value of 0.1349. Since the null hypothesis is
validity, this test failed to reject the null hypothesis at the 90% significance level. The
conclusion is that there is statistical evidence to show that instruments in the
overidentified Model 5 are valid for estimating the partial effect on daily childcare.
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DISCUSSION
The estimated models indicate that, with few exceptions, expected signs of
coefficients based economic intuition hold. The following paragraphs provide some
speculation and interpretation as to the positive and negative magnitudes of the
coefficients in the models.
Models 1 and 2 are included only to show the naïve regression estimates between
the main explanatory variable snapdoll and the dependent variable childcare. However,
these are only included as a baseline to start from. It should be understood that the
coefficients maybe biased as many relevant variables are omitted.
Model 3 has a higher R-squared value than the two previous OLS models. This
stands to econometric reason that adding right-hand-side variables in OLS necessarily
increases the R-squared, or fit of the model. Model 3 also has the highest R-squared value
of any of the models reported in this paper. Snapdoll has a positive coefficient, as
expected, because receiving a food subsidy allows parents to work less and stay in the
household more to engage in more daily childcare, on average. As stated earlier, the
relatively small magnitude of the coefficient is related to the small incremental values of
the units of the dependent variable, namely minutes.
Age shows a negative coefficient. This could be because younger parents are
more likely to spend more time in the household to stay with their children. It could also
be true that younger parents are more likely to have fewer children and may feel the need
to stay closer to a firstborn child as opposed to a third- or fourth-born child. Sex has a
large, positive coefficient. This is because of the way the variable is coded in STATA©
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with female being the larger discrete value. This coefficient suggests that women engage
more in childcare than men, on average.
Marrwsp shows a negative coefficient. Intuition would lead to the possible
conclusion that having a spouse in the home means that the parents can split time in
childcare. Therefore, a negative coefficient would make sense. Marrwosp showed a larger
negative coefficient than households where the spouse is still in the household. Again,
economic intuition would lead to the conclusion that single parents must spend more time
in other activities other than childcare. In this scenario, the single parent needs to work
more in order to provide income enough to pay for food, taking time away from potential
childcare. Marrwspchild is the largest coefficient in magnitude and the largest positive
coefficient in Model 3. Combining the pieces of the coded multi-interaction variable, it
makes sense that the presence of a child means that there is more childcare taking place
in the household. Marrwospchild is positive with a smaller magnitude with the related
variable where the spouse is still in the household. Following the logic from above, the
presence of a child allows for more childcare and being a single parent may force the
parent to work more, taking time away from childcare.
Empstat has a positive coefficient. Being employed allows for an increase in
childcare. This could be from the security of having a job as opposed to the time involved
in searching for a job that could take away from childcare. Multjobs has a negative
coefficient meaning that having more than one job takes time from childcare. This makes
sense because trying to work more with several jobs takes time away from being in the
household and therefore potential time spent engaging in childcare. Income has a
negative coefficient. It could be true that households with more income are more likely to
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pay for childcare outside of the household because they have the financial ability to do
so. This would crowd out childcare time spent in the household. The final variable is
hhsize which has a positive coefficient. This is because more people in the household
means that there are more individuals who can engage in childcare throughout the day. In
addition, more household members likely means that children are present. This can take
the form of a stay-at-home spouse or living with older generations of family members
that stay in the household for longer periods during the day. Regardless of which avenue
the extra childcare occurs, having more people in the household leads to the result of
more time spent in daily childcare on average.
Model 4 is the 2SLS model and the only model reported where the main
explanatory variable snapdoll has a negative coefficient. However, the coefficient is
statistically insignificant. Actually, snapdoll in Model 4 is the only variable in any of the
models reported that is not statistically significant at the 90% level. Because of the
statistical insignificance, the confidence interval includes 0. This means that even though
the coefficient is negative, it is possible that the coefficient is 0 or is even positive.
Therefore, the negative coefficient has little explanatory power in explaining the
magnitude of childcare. So the partial effect, though possessing the wrong sign, can
essentially be ignored when drawing conclusions.
Age has a negative coefficient. Similar to above, this could be because younger
parents are more likely to stay in the household to stay with their children. It could also
be true that younger parents are more likely to have fewer children and may feel the need
to stay closer to a firstborn child as opposed to a third- or fourth-born child. Sex has a
large, positive coefficient that is greater in magnitude than Model 3. The sign is because
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of the way the variable is coded in STATA© with female being the larger discrete value.
This coefficient suggests that women, on average, are more likely to engage in daily
childcare than men, the same conclusion as above.
Marrwsp shows a negative coefficient. Intuition similar to above would lead to
the possible conclusion that having a spouse in the home means that the parents can split
time in daily childcare. Marrwosp should a larger negative coefficient than households
where the spouse is still in the household, which again is true in Model 4. Again,
economic intuition would lead to the possible conclusion that single parents may need to
take on more burden when it comes to providing household income. Marrwspchild is the
largest coefficient in magnitude and the largest positive coefficient in Model 4, but not as
large as the coefficient in Model 3. Combining the pieces of the coded multi-interaction
variable, it makes sense that the presence of a child means that there is more daily
childcare taking place in the household. Marrwospchild is positive with a smaller
magnitude with the related variable where the spouse is still in the household. Following
the logic from before, the presence of a child allows for more childcare and being a single
parent may force the parent to work more, taking time away from time spent in daily
childcare.
Empstat has a positive coefficient. Being employed allows for an increase in
daily childcare, on average. Multjobs has a negative coefficient meaning that having
more than one job takes time from daily childcare. This makes sense because trying to
work more with several jobs takes time away from being in the household and therefore
potential time spent engaging in daily childcare. Income has a negative coefficient. The
speculation as to why an income decreases daily childcare is explained above. The final
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variable is hhsize which has a positive coefficient. Regardless of which avenue the extra
childcare occurs, having more people in the household leads to more time spent in daily
childcare, on average.
Model 5 is the overidentified 2SLS model. Snapdoll has a positive coefficient, as
in every model except Model 4. Age shows a negative coefficient. The speculations
above ought to be similar to above for the previous models. The sign is because of the
way the variable is coded in STATA© with female being the larger discrete value.
Marrwsp shows a negative coefficient. Intuition similar to above would lead to
the possible conclusion that having a spouse in the home means that the parents can split
time in daily childcare. Marrwosp should a larger negative coefficient than households
where the spouse is still in the household, which again is true in Model 5. The
explanation is similar to the previous models. Marrwspchild is the largest coefficient in
magnitude and the largest positive coefficient in Model 5, but not as large as the
corresponding coefficients in the previous models. Marrwospchild is positive with a
smaller magnitude with the related variable where the spouse is still in the household.
Following the logic from before, the presence of a child allows for more childcare and
being a single parent may force the parent to work more, taking time away from daily
childcare, on average.
Again here, empstat has a positive coefficient. Being employed allows for an
increase in daily childcare, on average. Multjobs has a negative coefficient meaning that
having more than one job takes time from daily childcare, on average. The rationale is the
same from the previous models. Income, again, has a negative coefficient. The
speculation as to why an income decreases childcare is explained above. The final
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variable is hhsize which has a positive coefficient. Regardless of which avenue the extra
childcare occurs, having more people in the household leads to more time spent in daily
childcare, on average.
For a supplementary investigation, the subsample was restricted to include only
households that are SNAP eligible and have children. SNAP eligibility, again, is defined
at households that are below 130% of the poverty line. The presence of household
children consists of those children whose parents live in the same household. By
restricting the sample with two qualifiers, these results control for white noise that may
have affected the key variables in the study thus far, specifically by those households that
are SNAP eligible that do not have children. The following table shows descriptive
statistics. Notice that the interaction variables that included children, marrwspchild and
marrwospchild, are now excluded as any variation in these variables is now explained by
marrwsp and marrwosp, respectively. The only difference between the first pair of
interaction variables and the second pair is the presence of children in the household,
which all households do in this subsample. The inclusion of both pairs is redundant. Also
note that the observations for each variable have decreased, reflecting the second
qualifier to the sample. The estimation results pertaining to Model 6 and Model 7 are in
Table 10.
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Table 9. Descriptive Statistics for with Child Subsample.
Variable
variable
name
childcare
snapdoll
age
sex
marrwsp

marrwosp

empstat
multjobs

income

hhsize
ARRA1

Definition
STATA coding
daily childcare
(minutes)
SNAP assistance
($)
age of respondent
1 if male
2 if female
1 if respondent is
married and living with
spouse, 0 otherwise
1 if respondent is
married and living without
spouse, 0 otherwise
0 if employed
1 if unemployed
2 if not in the labor force
0 if no
1 if yes
midpoint of the
categories of the
average household income
(in $10,000)
number of people living
in respondent's
household
ARRA assistance
0 if year<2009, 1 otherwise

Subsample with child
Obs.

650,580

Mean
(Std. Dev.)
41.08495
(88.00602)
22.17748
(85.46133)
44.46106
(17.17129)
0.566255
(0.49559)
0.5138953
(0.49981)

650,580

0.0144702
(0.119419)

650,580

0.6700283
(0.91188)

650,580
27,998
650,580
650,580

650,580

0.0596499
(0.23684)

630,133

6.919729
(6.323024)

37,066
650,580

2.781606
(1.55813)
0.729134
(0.44441)

The model to be tested is the same as presented before in this paper with childcare
being the dependent variable and the magnitude of dollars of SNAP benefits received by
respondents being the main explanatory variable. The right-hand-side variables are the
same less the two redundant variables. The equation takes the following general form:
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𝑐ℎ𝑖𝑙𝑑𝑐𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑖 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 𝑠𝑛𝑎𝑝𝑑𝑜𝑙𝑙 + 𝛽2 𝑎𝑔𝑒 + 𝛽3 𝑠𝑒𝑥 + 𝛽4 𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑟𝑤𝑠𝑝 + 𝛽5 𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑟𝑤𝑜𝑠𝑝
+ 𝛽6 𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡 + 𝛽7 𝑚𝑢𝑙𝑡𝑗𝑜𝑏𝑠 + 𝛽8 ℎℎ𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒 + 𝛽9 𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒 + 𝜀𝑖
All of the econometric principles explained before still apply.
In this subsample, the Hausman test for endogeneity is performed on the OLS
regression. The Hausman test provides statistical evidence to support that the main
explanatory variable snapdoll is exogenous to the model in this subsample. The universal
F-statistic for the OLS model is 0.3700 with an associated p-value of 0.5449. The null
hypothesis is exogeneity, so this test failed to reject the null hypothesis at the 90%
significance level. Thus, there is strong statistical evidence to show that all variables in
the OLS Model 6 are exogenous.
Model 7 is an exactly identified instrumental variable 2SLS model for comparison
that uses the correctly coded, and therefore valid, ARRA1 as an instrument for snapdoll.
The same rationale for SNAP benefits possibly being endogenous and ARRA1 being a
valid instrument applies as above. An overspecified 2SLS model was tested, but the
Sargan test for validity came back with an associated p-value of 0.0000, providing strong
statistical evidence that the model was invalid. For this reason, the overspecified model is
not reported for this subsample.
In Model 6, the intercept, empstat, multjobs, income, and hhsize are significant at
the 95% level. Age, sex, and marrwsp are statistically significant at the 99% level. The
main explanatory variable snapdoll is also statistically significant at the 99% level.
Marrwosp is not statistically significant. For the OLS model, the child-contingent
subsample differs from Model 3 reported above most notably in marrwsp which changed
sign and is statistically significant with a greater positive magnitude than its counterpart
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in Model 3. Most likely, this is due to the exclusion of the now redundant marrwspchild.
Marrwosp is still negative but is no longer statistically significant. Snapdoll has a slightly
smaller negative coefficient but did not lose statistical significance compared to Model 3.
This would imply that the existence of household children slightly increases the average
expected minutes of daily childcare, which stands to reason. If there are children, there is
more childcare, on average. Age has a slightly smaller negative magnitude but is now
more statistically significant. The coefficient for sex increased in positive magnitude, but
the standard error more than doubled. The statistical significance remains the same at in
Model 3, however. Being female increases average childcare per day by a greater
magnitude when the subsample is contingent on the existence of children. Empstat is
larger in positive magnitude but lost some statistical significance. Multjobs increased in
negative magnitude, but the error term is almost twice as large causing it to lose some
statistical significance compared to Model 3. Income became greater in negative
magnitude at the same level of statistical significance. Hhsize change sign from positive
to negative and is still statistically significant. The intercept nearly tripled in positive
magnitude and had a doubling of its error term but gained statistical significance in
relation to Model 3.
In Model 7, the intercept, empstat, multjobs, and hhsize are statistically
significant at the 95% level. Age, sex, and marrwsp are statistically significant at the 99%
level. The main explanatory variable snapdoll as well as marrwosp and income are not
statistically significant. For the 2SLS model, the child-contingent subsample differs from
Model 4 reported most notably in marrwsp which changed sign and is statistically
significant with a greater positive magnitude than its counterpart in Model 4. Again, this
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is likely due to the exclusion of marrwspchild. Marrwosp changed sign, but is no longer
statistically significant. Snapdoll became smaller in negative magnitude and is still
statistically insignificant. The coefficient for age became slightly smaller in negative
magnitude but remains at the same level of statistical significance. The coefficient for sex
became about 50% larger than in Model 4, but has almost twice the standard error. Sex
has the same level of statistical significance. Hhsize changed from positive to negative
and is still statistically significant. Empstat became slightly larger in positive magnitude
but lost some significance. Multjobs became slightly larger in negative magnitude but
lost some significance. Income’s negative coefficient became smaller and is now
statistically insignificant. The intercept is twice as large as in Model 4.
On balance, limiting the sample to only include households with children shifted
the marriage interaction variables on a greater scale in absolute magnitude than the other
right-hand-side variables. This phenomenon could be that the included marriage variables
are now reflective of the two other marriage interaction variables that were contingent on
childcare before the restriction of the subsample. The only variable that changed sign
with any statistical significance is the size of the household. This could reflect that some
households may have several additional household adults but no children. The
households meeting that description are now excluded from the subsample contingent
upon children. In this way, households with several household adults and no children
could have been adding significant white noise to the estimates for childcare before the
restricted subsample analysis.
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Table 10. With Child Subsample Results.
Variable

(6)

(7)

26.33998**
(11.96072)
0.0564669***
(0.01195)
-.6860414***
(0.14368)
36.27843***
(4.55638)
36.18515***
(4.88367)
-3.619867
(11.80367)
5.743416**
(2.38187)
-18.54542**
(8.00615)
-5.447587**
(2.70083)
-2.072558**
(1.33775)

33.82541**
(16.76443)
-0.0126403
(0.11515)
-.7524238***
(0.17417)
37.66865***
(5.25713)
34.4397***
(5.62852)
-2.747514
(11.89139)
6.12733**
(2.45636)
-18.75308**
(8.15846)
-8.943996
(6.56721)
-0.4184277**
(3.11279)

n

3889

3889

R-squared

0.0599

0.0487

Prob - F

0.0000

0.0000

intercept
snapdoll
age
sex
marrwsp
marrwosp
empstat
multjobs
income
hhsize

* significant at the 90% level
** significant at the 95% level
***significant at the 99% level
This exercise in limiting the subsample is one of the ways this study can be
expanded. By limiting the sample to control for white noise and removing redundant
variables, the estimates from the models are more likely to reflect the actual relationship
between variables of interest. In this case, limiting the sample to being contingent upon
the existence of children made for several sign and significance changes. Other
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extensions include using different linear approximations to attain estimates with more
controls. One such way to achieve this is with a difference-in-difference model to control
for changes in the overall economic environment over time instead of only controlling for
changes in specific household observations over time.
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CONCLUSION
The most important take away from this study is that there is evidence that
enrollment in the Supplementary Nutrition Assistance Program increases the amount of
time that parents can engage in childcare with their children in the household. Through
the course of the literature review, SNAP is shown to decrease food insecurity and make
for more successful children, both sociologically and economically, later in their lives.
Multiple models are reported because it is impossible to determine which is most
appropriate for determining the partial effect of SNAP enrollment on childcare. That
being said, there is statistical evidence that both provide valid econometric arguments in
favor of Model 5.
Future studies could potentially examine the differences between the proposed
models to determine which is most appropriate for the estimation. Along those lines,
other food subsidies whose aim is to decrease food insecurity could be examined in a
similar framework as the one presented in this paper to determine their viability in
increasing the amount of childcare that parents are able to take part in each day. Another
potential study that could come from the conclusions in this paper could be to examine
the requirements to enroll in SNAP. Specifically, investigating if food insecurity could be
decreased in a broader range of people is certainly worth studying, especially if there are
positive aspects such as increased daily childcare.
The conclusions in this paper suggest that increasing the magnitude of SNAP
dollars is beneficial to household childcare and food security. By continuing this
framework to investigate other food subsidies, the overall magnitude of subsidized food
dollars could be increased. This would lead to children who are better off later in life
even though they were raised in low income households and experienced some food
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insecurity, which the literature shows gives them a disadvantage later in life. Political
debates, adverse selection, and moral hazard aside, there is statistical evidence to support
that increasing the magnitude of food subsidies is beneficial for children experiencing
food insecurity.
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